Differences of Opinion and International Equity Markets by Bernard Dumas et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND INTERNATIONAL EQUITY MARKETS
Bernard Dumas
Karen K. Lewis
Emilio Osambela
Working Paper 16726
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16726
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
January 2011
Dumas and Osambela acknowledge with thanks the financial support of the Swiss National Center
for Competence in Research in "FinRisk".  We thank for valuable comments Daniel Andrei, Philippe
Bacchetta, Sebastien Betermier, Guiseppe Bertola, Philip Bond, Markus Brunnermeier, Giancarlo
Corsetti, Julien Cujean, Stephan Dieckman, Charles Engel, Linda Goldberg, Amit Goyal, Robert Hauswald,
Burton Hollifeld, Julien Hugonnier, Philipp Illeditsch, Urban Jermann, Jakub Jurek, Andrew Karolyi,
Leonid Kogan, André Kurman, David Ng, Stavros Panageas, Anna Pavlova, Krishna Ramaswamy,
Bryan Routledge, Duane Seppi, Jose Scheinkman, Norman Schürhoff, Chris Sims, Nicholas Souleles,
Pascal St-Amour, Luke Taylor, Chris Telmer, Raman Uppal, Wei Xiong, Motohiro Yogo, Fabrizzio
Zilibotti and seminar participants at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, University
of Lausanne, the CEPR conference "Fourth Annual Workshop on Global Interdependence" at the European
University Institute, the NBER meeting of International Finance and Macroeconomics, Princeton University,
Carnegie Mellon University, the "Adam Smith Asset Pricing Conference" at the Oxford-Man Institute
and the AFA meetings. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Bernard Dumas, Karen K. Lewis, and Emilio Osambela. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Differences of Opinion and International Equity Markets
Bernard Dumas, Karen K. Lewis, and Emilio Osambela
NBER Working Paper No. 16726
January 2011
JEL No. F3,G11,G12,G15
ABSTRACT
We develop an international financial market model in which domestic and foreign residents differ
in their beliefs about the information in economic signals. Similar to models of asymmetric information,
we consider how informational advantages by domestic investors about local output impacts equity
markets. In contrast to these models, however, all information is publicly available, but domestic investors
are better equipped to understand the information in local news. We show that our model can help
explain four standard international pricing anomalies: (i) home equity preference; (ii) the co-movement
of returns and international capital flows; (iii) the dependence of firm returns on local and foreign
factors; and (iv) abnormal returns around foreign firm cross-listing in the local market.
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osambela@cmu.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Informational diﬀerences across countries have long been used to explain international equity port-
folios and their ﬂows. For example, Gehrig (1993) posits that domestic residents have more certainty
about domestic fundamentals information than do foreigners, thereby reducing the optimal hold-
ings of foreign assets and exhibiting home-equity preference.1 As a second example, Brennan and
Cao (1997) show that foreign purchases of domestic equities are positively correlated with domestic
stock returns. They argue that these capital inﬂows occur because domestic residents see more pre-
cise signals about local fundamentals, while less informed foreigners react to price changes, buying
more domestic equity.2 These international portfolio arguments are typically framed in models in
which domestic residents are simply endowed with better private signals about the local market.
Informational advantages between local and foreign investors are also used anecdotally to explain
t h ec o v a r i a n c es t r u c t u r eo fﬁrm-level equity pricing behavior in at least two cases. First, domestic
ﬁrm returns depend upon both local and foreign market factors. This return behavior is often
loosely considered evidence of capital market segmentation, with diﬀering information across home
and foreign investors as a potential source.3 As a second case, the stock prices on foreign ﬁrms
that cross-list in domestic markets tend to increase, generating abnormal returns around this event.
Some have argued that returns are higher for cross-listing foreign ﬁrms because the ﬁrm commits to
abide by the requirements of the home country and thereby reduces uncertainty to investors.4 These
informational diﬀerences are generally simply posited as potential explanations of the international
pricing behavior.
Although international informational diﬀerences is a commonly-cited explanation of interna-
tional equity market regularities, there has so far been no uniﬁed framework to jointly address the
wide-range of portfolio ﬂow and pricing relationships in the examples above. The lack of a com-
mon framework stems from two main features of the standard “noisy rational expectations” (NRE)
1This argument extends the Merton (1987) model of investor familiarity to international equity.
2A number of papers such as Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), and Brennan et al. (2005) have found the pattern
of co-movement in foreign capital ﬂows and both actual returns and beliefs about these returns.
3For studies ﬁnding local and foreign factors in international returns and the associated debate on the number of
factors, see Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), Brooks and Del Negro (2004, 2006), and Bekaert et al. (2009), among
others.
4This argument has been termed the “bonding hypothesis.” See Coﬀee (1999, 2002) and the discussion in Karolyi
(2006).
1model typically used to consider capital ﬂows. First, the equilibrium dynamics of the wealth and
consumption of the investors are not tightly modeled, as resources come from and go to exogenous
noise traders and also come and go from an exogenous riskless security available in inﬁnitely elastic
supply. Investors simply receive payoﬀs and consume in a ﬁnal period.5 Second, NRE models
generally assume constant absolute risk-aversion investors. However, the assumption seems to be
fairly restrictive since changes in risk-aversion and wealth eﬀects are an important determinant in
ﬁrm-level returns as well as general asset pricing. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to use these models to
directly address ﬁrm-level pricing observations.
By contrast, in this paper, we propose a model based upon international diﬀerences in per-
ceptions of economic information that both incorporates the equilibrium consumption of investors
and allows for constant relative risk-aversion. As such, the model can be used to address all four
of the international equity pricing regularities mentioned above. In doing so, we build upon two
recent papers that examine the equilibrium behavior of asset prices when investors have diﬀer-
ences of opinion about the informativeness in commonly observed signals. Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) develop a model in which investors must infer some features of the current output process
by observing current outputs and public signals, but these investors have diﬀerent beliefs about
the correlations between the signals and the unobserved features. In their model, investors are
risk-neutral and face short-sale constraints. Dumas, et al. (2009) consider a similar setting but
allow for risk averse investors and remove the short-sale restrictions.
There is no denying that the approach we take, often labelled “the diﬀerence-of-opinion” ap-
proach, entails some irrational learning on the part of investors. But there is ample precedent for
it in the Economics literature. Previous contributions include: Harris and Raviv (1993), and Cec-
chetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). See Morris (1995) for a discussion of this approach and Kandel and
Pearson (1995) for empirical evidence. Kandel and Pearson cite Ariel Rubinstein (1993):
“In almost all models of economic theory, behavioral diﬀerences among consumers
are attributed to diﬀerences in preferences or in the information they possess. In real
life, diﬀerences in consumer behavior are often attributed to varying intelligence and
5See Lowenstein and Willard (2006).
2ability to process information. Agents reading the same morning newspapers with the
same stock price lists will interpret the information diﬀerently.” [our emphasis]
The international focus of our analysis requires a fuller model than Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
and Dumas et al. (2009). In our model, representative investors live in two countries, each endowed
with an output-paying process. These investors do not observe the time-varying expected value of
the growth rate of either output, but they observe a signal in each country that is conditionally
correlated with the change in the expected growth rate of the corresponding country’s output.
Each investor correctly perceives that the information in his own country’s signal is valuable, but
incorrectly believes that the information in the other country’s signal is just noise. This perception
captures the idea that, while foreigners may see domestic information as well as home residents,
they do not know how to interpret it. Thus, while the earlier models about capital ﬂows and
home equity preference typically assume that the informational advantage to domestic residents
arises from more precise, privately observed signals, we assume that the informational advantage
arises from the country’s ability to interpret public signals. Domestic investors have some form of
informational advantage, in the same spirit as the asymmetric information literature. As such, the
assumption is motivated by the same evidence used to suggest asymmetric information models.6
However, our assumption has further intuitive appeal because we do not require the informational
advantage to be hidden. Even Brennan and Cao (1997) acknowledge that “communication across
countries is now close to instantaneous.”
Our investors will diﬀer in their ability to interpret signals about expected foreign growth rates
of output. For that, we require an information structure that provides two important features.
First, we assume that domestic residents have an informational advantage about their own output
relative to foreigners. Second, in order to analyze equilibrium with complete markets, domestic
and foreign investors must be able to see the same variables. We incorporate both of these features
into the following simple information assumption: while all investors see the same information,
6Hau (2001) ﬁnds that the proﬁts of professional traders inG e r m a ns t o c k sa r eh i g h e rf o rt h o s el o c a t e di nG e r m a n y
or in German-speaking countries. Brennan et al. (2005) analyze surveys of expectations and the purchases of domestic
assets by foreign institutional investors and ﬁnd that these investors are at an informational disadvantage. For an
attempt at discriminating empirically between the two meanings of “information advantage”, see Banerjee (2010). In
a panel-data analysis of Norwegian household portfolios, Doskeland and Hvide (2010) ﬁnd employer-equity preference
with no return-based evidence of informational advantage.
3domestic investors are better equipped to understand the information about conditional growth
rates conveyed in the domestic signal. Since home investors interpret their own signal diﬀerently
from foreign investors, observations of output and signals generate diﬀerences of opinion about the
future growth rate of output. As a result, investors in each country accurately perceive that the
other country’s investors interpret the signal diﬀerently than they do. Moreover, the diﬀerence in
their beliefs creates an additional source of risk which we call “foreign-sentiment risk”, building on
Dumas et al. (2009).
This assumption may be motivated from at least three diﬀerent perspectives. First, it could be
that domestic investors have had a longer time to study the relationship between the signal and
the growth rate. From this perspective, it may be taking foreigners a longer time to learn how to
interpret the signal and we are looking at a long transitional time period. Second, foreigners may
simply have chosen not to become informed about the signal because they have viewed domestic
investment as too risky in the past and consider becoming informed too costly. For example,
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) show in a NRE model that when investors are endowed
with a small home information advantage, they choose not to learn what foreigners know. Third,
f o r e i g ni n v e s t o r sm a yn o tb ea b l et ol e a r nt h es a m e information as domestic residents. Acemoglu,
Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2009) show that when individuals are uncertain about the conditional
distribution of signals and outputs, even a small amount of individual uncertainty can lead to
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in asymptotic beliefs. We do not take a stand on which of these three
motivations is the correct one, but maintain the assumption that home investors are better at
understanding home signals throughout. In particular, investors in each country have correct beliefs
about the information in the signal that is correlated with the conditional expected growth rate of
output generated in their own country, but misinterpret the information coming from the foreign
signal. We stress, however, that in our setup both countries are equally rational or irrational, since
both of them (symmetrically) misinterpret the information about the other country.
To show how foreign-sentiment risk can produce the international asset pricing regularities
described above, we consider two versions of our basic model with as much parsimony as possible to
generate the basic stylized facts. First, to examine home-equity preference within this framework,
we focus on the stock markets of the two countries. In this version of the model, investors in
4each country have an identical set of ﬁve assets that complete the market of four independent
subjective Brownian motions: a risk-free asset, two equities with payoﬀs in the output process in
each country, and two futures contracts with payoﬀs marked in part to signal innovations (but
rendered independent of stock returns). When there are no current diﬀerences of opinion, domestic
investors shy away from holding foreign equity because they perceive that the variance of the
unobserved future growth rate is higher on foreign output. During periods when domestic investors
are relatively optimistic about foreign output, they may actually prefer foreign equity. However,
during equally likely periods when domestic investors are relatively pessimistic about foreign output,
they shun foreign equity by more. In the borderline case of no current disagreement between all
investors, domestic investors tend to hold more domestic equity at any given point in time because
they shy away from the risk created by the behavior of foreigners.
We then consider the eﬀects of diﬀerence of opinion on the capital ﬂows. We show that, when
domestic investors have an informational advantage in interpreting local signals, foreign capital
inﬂows will be positively related to domestic stock returns. The intuition in our model is similar to
that in Brennan and Cao (1997), though the actual economic mechanism is diﬀerent since there is
no information asymmetry in our model. When domestic output increases, the domestic stock price
increases. Foreigners over-react to this increase in output because they believe it means that the
future growth rate will increase as well. Since domestic investors have an advantage in interpreting
signals related to domestic output, they do not increase their view of the future domestic growth
rate by as much and therefore sell their equity to the foreigners. As such, foreign capital inﬂows
and domestic stock returns positively co-move.7
Next, to consider the eﬀects of diﬀerence of opinion on ﬁrm-level pricing behavior, we require
a slightly richer version of our basic model. We introduce an additional ﬁrm that operates in a
domestic market. Like the stock market, this ﬁrm has an output process with an unobserved mean
growth rate and a signal about this growth rate. Since the ﬁrm operates in the domestic market,
only local investors understand that the signal conveys information about the future growth rate.
To make markets complete in this version of the model, we allow investors to hold the equity on
7A similar question is raised in Xiouros (2010). Evidence on information-based international trades is provided in
Dong (2009).
5this ﬁrm as well as futures contracts on the ﬁrm’s signal.
We then use this expanded three-equities model version to consider the two ﬁrm-level pricing
observations. First, we examine the local and foreign factor asset pricing relationships. We start
by showing how foreign-sentiment risk can generate a local and world factor model in consumption.
We then show that, with foreign-sentiment, the betas from regressing our ﬁrm-level excess returns
on the home and foreign country stock excess returns would imply a higher beta on the local
market than the foreign market, consistent with typical empirical ﬁndings. For the second pricing
observation, we examine the impact of cross-listing. For this purpose, we assume that our domestic
ﬁrm now cross-lists in the foreign market. We conjecture that this cross-listing enables the foreign
country’s investor to correctly interpret information about the expected growth rate of the domestic
ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. Because cross-listing aligns perceptions about the information in public signals,
the resulting decline in disagreement risk decreases the required return and increases the price.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the information set up of the
model and the equilibrium, including consumption and the state-price density. Section 3 describes
the securities-market implementation of the equilibrium. Section 4 describes how the model can
generate home equity preference and can produce the positive covariation between capital ﬂows and
stock returns. Section 5 describes the factor structure of returns within our model and demonstrates
how the ﬁnal empirical regularity — the apparently abnormal returns of ﬁrm equity around the time
of cross-listing — can be explained. Section 6 demonstrates that the explanations we have provided
are enduring ones. Concluding remarks follow in Section 7.
2 The Foreign-Sentiment Risk Model
How much current economic variables and public signals help predict future variables is at the core
of standard asset pricing theories. Moreover, diﬀerences in perceptions about this informativeness
across countries have long been proposed as an explanation for various international asset pricing
anomalies, as described above. In this section, we provide a simple framework that captures both
these features. First, the informativeness of current economic variables and public signals aﬀects
forecasts of future variables and hence current prices of ﬁnancial securities. And, second, investors
6diﬀer across countries in their beliefs about the informativeness of these currently observed public
signals.
The basic features of these diﬀering beliefs and their impact on future expectations can be
shown most parsimoniously using a model with two ex ante identical countries. In each of the two
countries, labeled  and , live representative investors. The countries are completely integrated
in that they are open to international trade in securities and in a single, perishable good. Investors
i ne a c hc o u n t r ya r ei n i t i a l l ye n d o w e dw i t ho n es h a r e of their own output process, itself initialized
at the value 1. The ﬁnancial market is complete.
2.1 Exogenous outputs and public signals
The output delivered by economy ,  =  at time  is denoted  The stochastic process for
 is:


=  + 
,  =  (1)
where 
 are Brownian motions under the objective probability measure, which governs empirical
realizations of the process. The conditional growth rates  of outputs are also stochastic:
  = − ×
¡
 − 
¢
 + 

,  = 
where 0 and 

 are also Brownian motions under the objective probability measure.
The conditional growth rates of outputs  are not observed by any investor. All investors must
estimate, or ﬁlter out, the current value of  in order to value how future conditional mean growth
rates aﬀect forward-looking asset prices. They estimate this value by observing current outputs and
two public signals ( ). The signals follow the processes:
 = 

 +
q
1 − 2
 = 
where || ∈ [01] and where 
 is a third pair of Brownian motions, under the objective probability
measure as well. The term 

 in the stochastic diﬀerential equation for the signals means that the
signals are truly informative about output growth shocks 

 For parsimony, we assume that the
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³









´
are independent of each other. As we show
below, this independence, together with symmetry, signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes our analysis. Clearly,
however, some realism is lost by making an assumption of uncorrelated outputs across countries.
Note that, in these output and signal processes, the parameters are identical across countries.
Thus, the variances of the outputs and conditional growth rates,  and , the long-run means
of the conditional growth rates and their mean reversion parameter,  and , and the information
in the signal, , do not depend upon the country. Again, we maintain this assumption so that the
model is symmetric across the two countries.
2.2 The econometrician’s viewpoint
In the information model we develop below, no investor knows the true state of the economy. Hence,
the objective (or empirical) measure is not deﬁn e do ne i t h e ri n v e s t o r ’ s-algebra and we can ignore
it for the purpose of calculating the equilibrium.
In order to relate our equilibrium to empirical ﬁndings, however, we use a representation of
the way in which “the econometrician” would collect and process data on returns. Our abstract
description of the econometrician is based on the idea that he observes the same information as do
both sets of investors. Like the investors in each country, the econometrician does not observe the
true conditional growth rate of outputs and must ﬁlter this process. As in Xiong and Yan (2010),
however, we assume that the econometrician knows the structure of the economy, i.e., that he works
under that null hypothesis. Accordingly, the econometrician in his estimation of the model ﬁlters
the signal process under the hypothesis that:
 = 

 +
q
1 − 2
  = 
While no investor’s learning is as correct as that of the econometrician, we use the econometri-
cian’s probability measure as our benchmark in all calculations of empirical regularities. It will
prove convenient to calculate the probability measures of the two groups as deviations from the
econometrician’s probability measure.
8Thus, the econometrician conducts his analysis under the null hypothesis that the signals con-
vey information about the conditional growth rates in accordance with the correlation .U n -
like investors, he is not deluded. To calculate his probability measure, we rewrite the stochas-
tic diﬀerential equations in terms of processes that are Brownian motions under the econome-
trician’s probability measure. For this purpose, we deﬁne the four-dimensional process 
 =
³





´|
, where each of the components of 
 corresponds to a Brownian mo-
tion of each of the four observed variables under the probability measure of the econometrician.
Deﬁning b 
 as the conditional mean of the growth rate of output in Country  as estimated by the
econometrician, we use ﬁltering theory to compute these conditional expected values.8 For  = ,
these expectations are given by:
b 
 = − ×
³
b 
 − 
´
 +



 + 
 (2)
where the number  is the steady-state variance of b 
 and b 
, these variances being equal to
each other by virtue of symmetry:
 , 2

⎛
⎝
s
2 +
¡
1 − 2¢ 2

2

− 
⎞
⎠ (3)
This variance would normally be a deterministic function of time. But for simplicity we assume,
as did Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Dumas et al. (2009), that there has been a suﬃciently
long period of learning for people of both countries to converge to their long-run level of variance,
independent of their prior. Equation (2) shows how the econometrician ﬁlters the conditional
growth rate with observations of outputs and signals. When he sees an increase in the output of
Country , he updates his estimate of the conditional mean growth rate by the ratio of its steady
state variance  and the variance of the output . When he sees an increase in the signal of
Country , he increases his view of  according to , which measures the information precision in
the signal about this growth rate.
8See Lipster and Shiryaev (2000), Theorem 12.7, page 36.
9By deﬁnition of the growth rates b 
 and b 
, we can then write:


= b 
 + 
 (4)


= b 
 + 
 (5)
Comparing these equations to (1) implies that the relationship between the output Brownian mo-
tions under the objective measure and the output Brownian motions under the econometrician’s
(’s) measure is given by:

 =
 − b 


 + 
 ,  =  (6)
The signals having zero drift both objectively and in the econometrician’s eyes, the processes for
the signals can be written under ’s measure as:9
 = 
,  =  (7)
2.3 The investors’ viewpoint
The diﬀerence in information processing by the investors of the two countries is implemented as
follows. Investors in Country  perform their ﬁltering under the belief that the signal  has the
correct conditional correlation with  but they believe incorrectly that the signal  has zero
correlation with  The “model” they have in mind is:
 = 

 +
q
1 − 2
 (8)
 = 
 (9)
Notice that investors of Country  have the same model of signal  as the econometrician (incor-
porating the true correlation ) but a diﬀerent one (incorporating a correlation equal to zero) for
9While the signal process under the objective measure depends upon two diﬀerent processes 
 and 
,i tc a nb e
shown that this signal can be written as a single Brownian motion.
10the signal . Symmetrically, the “model” that investors of Country  have in mind is:
 = 
 (10)
 = 

 +
q
1 − 2
 (11)
Notice that investors of Country  have the same model of signal  as the econometrician but a
diﬀerent one for the signal .
Deﬁning b 
 as the conditional mean of the output in Country  as estimated by investors of
Country  we implement ﬁltering theory one more time, to write:
b 
 = − ×
³
b 
 − 
´
 +

2

µ


− b 

¶
+  (12)
b 
 = − ×
³
b 
 − 
´
 +

2

µ


− b 

¶
 6=  (13)
where the number  is the steady-state variance of the “transnational” estimates b 
 and b 
,
their variances being equal by virtue of symmetry:
 = ¯ ¯
=0 = 2

Ãs
2 + 2

1
2

− 
!
Note from (3) that  decreases as the information in the signal measured by 2 rises. Intuitively,
the signal  allows the econometrician and investors in country  t og e tam o r ep r e c i s ee s t i m a t e
of , thereby reducing the steady-state variance for investors in country ’s estimate. By contrast,
investors in country  6=  ignore the information in the signal  and thereby attribute more of the
variability to  As a result, the steady-state variance for the conditional growth rate forecast of
home output will be lower for home investors than the corresponding variance of the foreign output
forecast; i.e.,    = ¯ ¯
=0, a relationship we will use below.
Since the econometrician’s hypothesis about signals is, in fact, not in line with the assumptions
made by investors in any of the two countries, diﬀerences in beliefs are generated. We deﬁne the
11“disagreements” between the econometrician and the investors as:
b 

 ≡ b 
 − b 

;  = 
In principle, b 

 represents two pairs of disagreements for each country’s investor. However, the
econometricians and the investors agree about the estimate of the conditional growth rate of their
own output since they are ﬁltering in the same way. Therefore, b 
 ≡ b 
 − b 
 =0and b 
 =
b 
 − b 
 =0so that only b 
 ≡ b 
 − b 
 and b 
 = b 
 − b 
 the disagreements between the
econometrician and the foreign country’s forecast of the domestic output growth rate, move over
time. Using the last four equations, we get the dynamics for the disagreements:
b 

 = −
µ
 +

2

¶
b 

 +
µ
 − 

¶

 + 
;  6= ;  =  (14)
Given the econometrician’s ﬁlter in Equation (2), it is clear what drives the disagreements in
Equation (14). On the one hand, an increase in the output of, say, Country A, 
,c a u s e st h e
econometrician to update his estimate of b 
 according to

 . However, this same output change
will induce investors in country  to increase their estimate by

 . Since these investors ignore the
signal information, they update their estimate by more than informed investors in Country  (and
more than the econometrician). Thus, since   ,C o u n t r y investors over-react to the output
increase and the disagreement between these investors and the econometrician declines, b 
  0
In this case, Country  investors become relatively optimistic about Country  output. On the
other hand, an increase in the signal 
 will induce the econometrician to increase his estimate
of the conditional mean b 
. Since Country  investors do not use the signal information, the signal
increases the disagreement about Country  output, b 
  0. In this case, Country  investors
become relatively pessimistic about Country . Foreign investors under-react to a domestic signal
and over-react to domestic output. Domestic investors react properly to both domestic output and
domestic signal.
To examine further how the information looks to each country’s investor, we rewrite the dividend
and signal processes from the viewpoint of each investor. For this purpose, we also consider a set
of four-dimensional processes for each country that is Brownian under the probability measure of
12investors in Country ; 

 =
³









´
= . Since we use the viewpoint of the
econometrician as a reference, the probabilities of events will look diﬀerent from the point of view
of the investors in the two countries. How the probabilities evolve according to the econometrician
and the two investors is captured by the change in measure between the set of Brownians perceived
by the econometrician, 
  a n db yt h ei n v e s t o ri nc o u n t r y, 

. These processes diﬀer according
to:

 = 

 −
b 



 (15)

 = 
 (16)
for,  = .I t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t 
 and 
 can be treated as independent Brownian
motions. From Equations (15) and (16) and Girsanov theorem, we can obtain the changes from
the probability measure of the econometrician to those of investors in Country  and ,c a p t u r i n g
the diﬀerences of probability beliefs between these countries, as being given by:
 = −
b 



 (17)
 = −
b 



 (18)
We give the diﬀerence in beliefs  the picturesque name of “Country  sentiment” (relative to the
rational econometrician’s beliefs). Disagreements b 
 and b 
 are the drivers of the instantaneous
volatilities of the sentiment variables. The change of measure between an investor of a country and
the econometrician is perfectly (positively or negatively) correlated with the output in the other
country. For example,  depends upon realizations of the output in Country  according to

 T h es i z eo ft h i se ﬀect depends upon the current disagreement between the econometrician
and investors in Country , b 
 If investors in Country  are currently optimistic about Country
,t h e nb 
  0 Since Country  investors over-react to the output process in Country ,t h i s
will further increase the diﬀerence in probabilities and  increases. The evolution of  does
not depend upon Country  outputs since the econometrician and the Country  investors agree
about the ﬁlter of that process.
13We have now deﬁned the evolution of the state vector. The Markovian system comprised of
Equations (4), (5), (2), (14), (17) and (18) completely characterize the dynamics of eight exogenous
state variables that drive the economy, deﬁned by the vector:
 ≡
³
 b 
b 
 b 
b 

´|
.H o w e v e r , t h e ﬁrst four components of the vector
are only driven by the Brownians on the output and signal of Country ,w h i l et h el a s tf o u r
components of the vector are driven by the corresponding Brownians for Country . Therefore,
the state vector can be written as two independent processes:  = { } where:
 =
n
 b 
b 


o|
for  = ;  6=  Each of these two processes is driven by separate Brownians but they have
equal diﬀusion matrices. In particular,
 =  + Ω

where

 =
©



ª
and
Ω =
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
 0
³


´

³
−

´

−
µ
 



¶
0
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
; 6= 
Thus, the state vector can be evaluated as two independent processes, each governing the evolution
of views about each country’s output. For instance, the full vector of eight state variables  can
be written as:
 =  + Ω− →  

where
− →  
 =
©





ª
14and
Ω =
⎡
⎢
⎣
Ω 0
0 Ω
⎤
⎥
⎦
The block diagonal structure of Ω will be exploited in our solution of the equilibrium below.
2.4 Individual optimization problem
We now use the information structure to derive equilibrium pricing relationships. For this purpose,
we assume that the investors in the two countries have identical time-separable utility functions in
a common perishable consumption good. For Country  investors, the problem can be written as:
sup

E
0
Z ∞
0
− 1


; 1 (19)
subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
E
0
Z ∞
0

 ( − ) ≤ 0 (20)
where 
 is the state price density under the econometrician’s measure. Note that we write the
optimization in equation (19) using the expectation of the econometrician at initial time 0. We
indicate this expectation with the superscript  in the expectation operator, E
0 . We multiply the
period utility of  at time  by the change of measure variable, , to get back to the expectation
under the measure of .T h eﬁrst-order conditions of this optimization imply that consumption of
Country  residents is:
 =
µ




¶− 1
1−
(21)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint (20). Country  residents face a
symmetric optimization problem, that can be written identically to (19), (20), and (21) above,
with  replaced by .
152.5 Equilibrium pricing measure
We now use the optimal consumption plan for each country to solve for the stochastic price density.
For this purpose, we set the sum of the optimal consumption for  in (21) and the counterpart for
Country  to the sum of the two output processes.10 Thus, we have:
µ




¶− 1
1−
+
µ




¶− 1
1−
=  +  (22)
Solving this equation for the state price density 
 implies:

 ()=−
"µ


¶ 1
1−
+
µ


¶ 1
1−
#1−
( + )
−1 (23)
The state price density relative to the econometrician’s measure, 
  depends upon the changes in
probability measure of both countries. In fact, it is homogeneous of degree 1 in these two variables.
Proposition 1: The state-price density (23) contains two priced factors: world output,  +
 and world average11 sentiment
∙³


´ 1
1− +
³


´ 1
1−
¸1−

The two priced factors, however, are conditionally correlated: as we have seen (Equation (17)),
sentiment  is perfectly correlated with output innovations , 
, but the sign of that corre-
lation depends on the sign of the current disagreement b 
, and vice versa. If and when there is
full agreement today (b 
 = b 
 =0 ), these correlations become equal to zero. In all cases, the
pricing measure (23) means that, in the presence of sentiment, equilibrium prices now contain an
additional risk premium, over and above the classic premium based on total consumption.
In equilibrium, each country’s share of world consumption is given by a monotonic transforma-
tion of the ratio of the two changes of probability measure. Deﬁning Country ’s share as :
 ,

 + 
;1 −  =

 + 
(24)
10The econometrician is not a participant in the economy.
11This is a harmonic average.
16its equilibrium value is given by:

µ


¶
=
³




´ 1
1−
1+
³




´ 1
1−
(25)
or:
 = 
µ


¶
( + )
As in Dumas et al. (2009), the consumption-sharing rule is linear in aggregate output,  + ,
and its slope, ,i sd r i v e nb yt h er a t i oo fC o u n t r y beliefs to Country  beliefs,
¡

¢
.
This relationship can be understood intuitively as follows. When the investors of Country  have
deemed an event more likely to occur than did investors of Country , they have bet on that event
through
¡

¢
and, when it occurs, they get to consume more. Isomorphically, one could
interpret the allocation coming out of the complete markets problem: when
¡

¢
is high, the
ratio of marginal utility of Country  divided by marginal utility of Country  is high. Investors will
then trade contingent assets across countries that will pay oﬀ in these states. In this way, changes
of probability measure act as taste shocks in each country.
In the standard case without foreign-sentiment

 ,

 and

 are perfectly correlated. By
contrast, in our case the cross-country consumption correlation is below one, except at exceptional
times of full agreement. Hence, the sentiment adjustment is particular to each consumption process
considered.
It will be useful to note, as did Yan (2008) and Dumas et al. (2009), that, if we assume that
risk aversion 1 −  is a positive integer (which can be true only when investors have risk aversion
greater than or equal to 1), one can use the binomial theorem to expand the state-price density.
17The square bracket expression in equation (23) is then written as a sum of powers:12
"µ


¶ 1
1−
+
µ


¶ 1
1−
#1−
=
1

1− X
=0
µ
1 − 

¶µ




¶ 
1−
=
1

1− X
=0
µ
1 − 

¶
⎡
⎣

³


´
1 − 
³


´
⎤
⎦

(26)
We next specify a menu of assets to examine the implications of this model for the ﬁrst two
regularities discussed in the introduction.
3 Financial securities prices and international portfolio choice
3.1 Securities market implementation
To consider the aggregate equity market implications described above, we require a set of securities
that both complete the market and make our diﬀerence-of-opinion eﬀects most transparent. To
complete the market, we need ﬁve securities with non linearly dependent payoﬀss i n c ew eh a v e
four linearly independent Brownians that are observable by investors. Given the aggregate equity
market focus of the two regularities in this section, stocks that pay oﬀ on claims to each country’s
output are a natural choice.
Therefore, the ﬁrst two securities in the menu of assets are equities with equilibrium stock
prices denoted  and  Equities are inﬁnitely long-lived and pay amounts equal to outputs
perpetually at every instant, so that the equilibrium prices are:
 =
Z ∞

E

∙





¸
;  =  (27)
12The state price is the sum of 1 −  terms. The term  =0can be interpreted as the inﬂuence of investors in
Country  on prices: if one increases their weight in the market, the sum approaches the value of this term (calculated
at  =0 ). In the same interpretation, the term  =1−  represents the inﬂuence of investors in Country .
18Using our equilibrium state price density, stock prices can be written as:

µ


 b 
 b 
b 
b 

¶
=
Z ∞

E

∙





¸

=
∙
1 − 
µ


¶¸1−

Z ∞

−(−)
1− X
=0
⎡
⎢
⎣
µ
1 − 

¶⎛
⎝

³


´
1 − 
³


´
⎞
⎠

(28)
×E

⎡
⎣
µ


¶ 
1− µ


¶1−

1− µ


¶
⎛
⎝
1+


1+


⎞
⎠
−1⎤
⎦
⎤
⎦

µ


 b 
 b 
b 
b 

¶
=
Z ∞

E

∙





¸

=
∙
1 − 
µ


¶¸1−

Z ∞

−(−)
1− X
=0
⎡
⎢
⎣
µ
1 − 
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Subsection 3.4 shows how to obtain the expectation terms as explicit functions of
n
b 
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− 
o

As a way of deﬁning expected returns and volatilities of equities, we write the dynamics of
returns on the stocks  and  as:
 + 

= b 
 + 

 
 + 

 
 + 

 
 + 

 
,  =  (29)
where b 
 are the conditional mean returns under the reference measure, and
 =
∙


 

 

 


¸
are the endogenous diﬀusions of stock returns. All of these quan-
tities are obtained in equilibrium as explicit functions of the state variables, following the same
methodology as in Dumas et al. (2009).
We need three more securities to complete the market. We want to choose a menu of securities
that allows investors to allocate their risk exposures to output shocks exclusively through country
19equities.13 In this way, we can ensure that the equity preference is truly the result of higher
exposures to own country output shocks and is not polluted by indirect allocations via non equity
securities. To that aim, we add to the menu three securities that are neutral vis-à-vis output risk.
The ﬁrst one is the riskless instantaneous bank deposit with interest rate .
The other two are zero-net supply futures contracts in part marked to the ﬂuctuations of the
public signal from each country, but designed to be uncorrelated with the stock prices. The prices of
the two additional “signal futures contracts” are deﬁned as  and , and follow the processes:
 = b 
 + 

 
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
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 + 

 
,  = 
where b 
 are continuously determined so that the aggregate demand for each of these securities
is always zero, and  =
∙

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¸
,f o r = ,a r eexogenously chosen dif-
fusions of futures price changes. We choose this exogenous diﬀusion in such a way that futures
prices are uncorrelated with the stock prices. The diﬀusion of risky ﬁnancial securities prices
{   } is then given by
Σ =
⎡
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(30)
The ﬁrst two rows of this matrix are obtained following the same steps as in Dumas et al. (2009),
i.e. by premultiplying the diﬀusion matrix of state variables Ω by the gradients of the two equity
prices with respect to the state variables. The last two rows are set in such a way that the variance-
covariance matrix of ﬁnancial securities prices ΣΣ| is block diagonal.
3.2 Two-factor consumption CAPM
Proposition 1 and the state-price density in Equation (23) reveal that only two factors are priced:
world output and world average sentiment. The next proposition says that our model is consistent
13We are grateful to Anna Pavlova for her comment, in which she placed this requirement on us.
20with a two-factor consumption CAPM.
Proposition 2: The following two-factor CAPMs hold equally well:
b 
 −  =( 1− )
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where  =  +  is world consumption and  is a measure of world average sentiment
risk with
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Proof : The market price of risk is obtained by applying Itô Lemma to the state price density,
and identifying its diﬀusion vector. The CAPM risk premiums are derived from the market price
of risk.
The conditionally expected excess returns on the left-hand side of the CAPM correspond to
the way in which the econometrician would collect and process data on returns. The factors in
the CAPM represent consumption risk and sentiment risk. As in the standard consumption-based
CAPM, a security risk premium is positively correlated with the covariance of its return with the
country (world) consumption growth. The risk premium is decreasing in the covariance of the
security’s return with the country (world) sentiment.
The three CAPMs set in the proposition are equivalent to each other, and they imply that
the relevant sentiment risk measure depends on the consumption risk considered. For instance,
world consumption risk must be accompanied in the CAPM by world average sentiment risk, and
country consumption risk must be accompanied by the sentiment risk associated with the vagaries
from investors in that particular country. The ﬁrst CAPM equation considered above shows that
as e c u r i t yr i s kp r e m i u mi se x p l a i n e db yaw o r l dc o n s u m p t i o nr i s kf a c t o ra n daw o r l da v e r a g e
sentiment risk factor. In this case, if a national risk factor appears to be priced empirically, our
interpretation is that it is priced only as a proxy for world sentiment risk; its apparent pricing
21derives from its correlation with world average sentiment risk. The latter is the true unobserved
risk factor. Similarly, the next two CAPM equations show that a security risk premium is explained
by a country consumption risk factor and the corresponding country sentiment risk factor. In this
case, our interpretation is that the world risk factor is priced only as a proxy for national sentiment
risk. The latter is the true unobserved risk factor.
3.3 International portfolio choice
In order to analyze the exposures and portfolios of the representative international investors given
the menu of securities described above, we ﬁrst need to derive their total wealth processes. In doing
so, we view total wealth as the price of a security with payoﬀs equal to optimal consumption.14
The wealths of the representative country investors are given by:15
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14We could have focused, instead, on ﬁnancial wealth deﬁned as the present value of future consumption minus
country outputs. But we wish to obtain the total country exposure of an investor, whether arising from his portfolio
or from his endowments. In a complete market, the two approaches are obviously equivalent.
15As was the case for equities prices,subsection 3.4 shows how to obtain the expectation terms as a function of 
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22We deﬁne the 1 × 4 vector of desired, or “target”, exposures for the investor in Country  as
 :
 =
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¸
,  =  (31)
as the diﬀusion of these wealth processes. These are computed as the gradient of wealth with respect
to the seven state variables post-multiplied by the diﬀusion matrix Ω of the seven state variables.
If the investors had available to them elementary claims on output and signal shocks, the exposures
would indicate the desired amount of holdings of these claims.
With the menu of the two country stocks and the two futures contracts written on the signals
that we have described, investors must replicate or engineer the desired exposures. The 1×4 vector
 represents the numbers of units held by investors in Country  of each available ﬁnancial security:
 =
∙

 
 
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
¸
,  = 
This vector can be computed directly from a system of linear equations:
 =  × Σ (32)
where Σ is the diﬀusion of securities deﬁn e di nE q u a t i o n( 3 0 ) .
3.4 Transform Analysis
In order to obtain the prices of ﬁnancial securities as well as the country wealth processes (required
for constructing the portfolios), we need to compute the expected values of the product of the
change of measure with the payoﬀs. From the equations for the equilibrium state price density,
and the expressions obtained for the stock prices and wealths, it is clear that we need the joint
conditional distribution of
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at current time . While we cannot determine the full distribution,
we can derive a moment function or Fourier transform which allows us to obtain the required
expressions, E
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23In a “one-tree” version of our economy, Dumas et al. (2009) show that, by assuming that risk
aversion 1− is a positive integer (which can be true only when investors have risk aversion greater
than or equal to 1) and using the binomial theorem as in Equation (26), the moment function of
outputs and sentiment is enough for obtaining prices and portfolios. While this property is useful in
our setup, our problem is further complicated by the fact that the state price density (see Equation
(23)), in our model, contains a power of the sum of two outputs: ( + )
−1.T os e ew h yt h i s
complicates our problem, note that, since investors are risk averse, −1  0 the binomial theorem
cannot be used to expand that term. Clearly, obtaining exact solutions for the stock prices and
portfolio choice is more challenging in our “two-trees” setup.
In order to overcome this problem, we ﬁrst note that the marginal utility of aggregate outputs
can be expressed as:
( + )
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The moment generating function in Proposition 3 contains precisely these types of elements, and
can be used to obtain stock prices and wealths.
Proposition 3. The moment generating function needed for solving stock prices and wealths is
given by
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and (·) is a univariate standard normal density function. The functions 1, 2, 3, 1, 2,
3,a n d4 are given explicitly in the proof in the appendix.
4 Country-Level Equity and Empirical Regularities
We now consider the two country-level empirical regularities described in the introduction. First,
domestic investors tend to have a bias toward holding domestic equity, despite the potential portfolio
gains from holding more foreign equity, a phenomenon called “home-equity preference”. Second,
foreign purchases of domestic equity increase when domestic equity returns rise. We call this
phenomenon the “co-movement of foreign capital ﬂows and domestic returns”. Below, we discuss
each of these regularities in turn using our model.
4.1 Benchmark numerical values
To calculate our numerical examples, we base our parameter values and benchmark values for the
state variables on those in Dumas et al. (2009). In turn, they take their parameters from Brennan
and Xia (2001) who use these parameters to match features of US returns. The standard deviation
of the conditional expected growth rate of output, , as well as its speed of mean reversion, ,a r e
chosen to be higher than these studies in order to match the regularities as we describe below. We
derive all the results for Country  alone since our model is fully symmetric. The parameter values
25we use are given in Table 1.16’17
Table 1: Parameter values and benchmark values for the state variables used in all the numerical
examples
Parameter Value State variable Benchmark value
 02  1
 002  1
 0125  1
 095 b 
 
1 −  3 b 
 
 012 b 
 
 027 b 
 0
b 
 0
b 
 0

³


´
05
Note that the benchmark values of state variables reﬂe c tac u r r e n ts i t u a t i o no ff u l la g r e e m e n t
(b 
 = b 
 =0 ) both in the presence and absence of foreign-sentiment risk. Of course, even when
there is agreement today, there will be disagreement tomorrow because of diﬀerent interpretations
of signals.
As a ﬁrst indication of the inﬂuence of foreign-sentiment risk, we use our model to calculate the
price of each stock and the wealth of investors in each country. Due to symmetry in the benchmark
values of the state variables, stock prices and wealth will be the same across countries in this case.
Moreover, wealth and stock prices will also be the same within each country. These numbers are
reported in the ﬁrst four rows of Table 2.
As the table shows, the presence of sentiment reduces the stock price. Moreover, sentiment
risk reduces the volatility of stocks, reported in the ﬁf t ha n ds i x t hr o w s . I np a rticular, the equity
volatilities are equal to 053 in the absence of sentiment. With sentiment, these drop to 027.T h e
intuition is clear. Since half of the investors ignore foreign signals, volatility is lower with sentiment
than under rational learning.
16The growth condition, which ensures existence of stock prices, is satisﬁed by these parameter values. That is,
equity prices have a ﬁnite value.
17Firm  will be introduced in Subsection 5.1.
26Table 2: Eﬀect of sentiment on prices and on second moments of equity returns
No sentiment Sentiment
Price of Stock  1922 742
Price of Stock  1922 742
Wealth of  1922 742
Wealth of  1922 742
Volatility of Stock  return 053 027
Volatility of Stock  return 053 027
Correlation of Stock  and Stock  returns 097 084
The foreign-sentiment risk model also gives results that are similar to a segmentation model. In
many models, stock return correlations tend to be lower in a segmented market than in an integrated
one.18 As the last rows shows, the equity correlation is equal to 097 without sentiment, but this
correlation drops to 084 with sentiment. The high correlation of stock returns is particularly
noteworthy since we have assumed the output correlation to be equal to zero.
We now assess the ability of the model under the benchmark values to reproduce the “home-
equity preference” and the “co-movement of foreign capital and domestic returns”. To that aim, we
evaluate these empirical regularities using both our model with sentiment and our model without
sentiment in which all investors interpret correctly the information in both countries. We then
compare the results.
4.2 Home equity preference
Home-equity preference, or “home bias” as it is often called, is the observation that home residents
tilt their portfolios towards home equity. Evidence has been provided many times, including recently
in Ahearne, et al. (2004). Table 3 reports the proportion of foreign securities held in aggregate US
porftolios from the IMF coordinated survey.
A number of explanations have been proposed for “home bias”. Our sentiment-risk model could
be viewed as a complement rather than a substitute for these explanations. Nevertheless, it is useful
to note how our analysis compares to these standard groups. One set of explanations assumes that
18See Dumas, Harvey, Ruiz (2003).
27Table 3: Source: IMF coordinated survey
Year Foreign securities’s
share in U.S. portfolios
2001 20%
2002 21%
2003 23%
2004 26%
2005 29%
2006 29%
investors have utility functions that are non-separable between tradeable goods and items that are
not traded, such as leisure or non-tradeable goods.19 The plausibility of these arguments depends
upon whether the eﬀe c t so fn o n - t r a d e a b l e sr i s ki ss u ﬃciently large and of the right sign to explain
home bias.20 By contrast, our explanation does not depend upon non-separabilities in utility
since investors in both countries consume the same, single good. A second group of explanations
depends upon incomplete or segmented markets. In these models, some investors are restricted
from holding some securities or do not otherwise have access to assets capable of spanning the state
space.21 In our model, asset markets are complete and all investors have access to the same set of
securities. The third group of explanations assumes that investors receive asymmetric information
as in Noisy-Rational Expectations equilibria.22 Our explanation most closely resembles this group
of explanations. However, these explanations typ i c a l l yd e p e n du p o nas t a t i cp o r t f o l i op r o b l e m
and the presence of noise traders, who are not utility maximizers and who have outside resources.
By contrast, we endogenously determine equilibrium prices of ﬁnancial securities and the optimal
portfolio of ﬁnancial securities held by investors of both countries, in a fully closed dynamic general
equilibrium under symmetric information.
Using our solutions for the portfolio and wealth of country investors, we obtain an exact ex-
pression for the share of foreign (Country ) stocks held by local investors (in Country ), given
by:



 + 

19See for example Stockman and Tesar (1995) and Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002).
20See Lewis (1996) and Baxter and Jermann (1997).
21See Baxter and Crucini (1991), among others.
22This argument was posited by Gehrig (1993) and made dynamic by Brennan and Cao (1997).
28To evaluate the portfolio decisions and home equity preference using our model, we calculate
the target exposures in equation (31), the portfolio share of Country  investors in the home and
foreign stock, and the consumption correlation across countries.
Table 4 reports these numbers for the benchmark case. The impact of foreign-sentiment on the
equilibrium variables in the row is shown for each sentiment case in the column. Without foreign-
sentiment risk, given in the column labeled "No Sentiment", the share invested abroad is, of course,
equal to 50%. With foreign-sentiment risk and with the benchmark numbers given above, the share
drops to 38% when there is current agreement about the growth prospects of the two-countries,
b 
 = b 
 =0 .
Table 4: The impact of foreign sentiment on international portfolios. Negative numbers for dis-
agreements mean that investors are currently optimistic about foreign investment compared to the
econometrician’s beliefs
No sentiment Sentiment with Sentiment with Sentiment with
b 
 = b 
 =0 b 
 = b 
 = −0001 b 
 = b 
 = −001
Expos. of  to  output shock 017 −119
Expos. of  to  output shock 017 002
Expos. of  to  signal shock −709 −027
Expos. of  to  signal shock −709 −219
’s portfolio share invested in  5000% 3801% 4039% 6147%
’s portfolio share invested in  5000% 6199% 6961% 3853%
Consumption correlation 100 100 09964 06920
The exposure numbers are useful as a check that the home preference does not arise from the
menu of assets. The numbers verify that sentiment generates a target exposure toward domestic
output. Without sentiment, the desired exposures to output shocks and signals shocks are sym-
metric at 0.17 and -7.09, respectively. However, in the presence of sentiment, the  investor prefers
negative exposure to the foreign output shock at -1.19 and similarly reduces desired exposure to
the foreign signal.
Increasing the level of disagreement (last two columns of the table) produces a very interesting
result. A large increase/decrease represents a high degree of optimism/pessimism of one group of
29investors regarding the foreign country so that portfolio investment is proportionately aﬀected. The
last column in Table 4 conﬁrms that investors invest in a country when they are bullish about it.
Small increases in disagreement are more interesting. Recall that disagreement causes sentiment to
become more volatile (Equations (17, 18)). As we just saw, foreign-sentiment risk is a deterrent to
investing abroad. When disagreement of any sign is small, it is not large enough to create a potent
enough optimism or pessimism but it does increase the volatility of sentiment risk. Even with small
disagreements of either sign, there is some home bias. This reasoning is reﬂected in the numbers
of the last-but-one column of Table 4, labeled b 
 = b 
 = −0001.
The table also reports the eﬀects of sentiment risk on consumption correlations. Lewis (1999,
2000) has noted the connection between home-biased portfolio composition and less than perfect
correlation of consumption across countries. Intuitively, when investors of diﬀerent countries hold
portfolios with diﬀerent compositions, the correlation in the consumption resulting from these port-
folio choices should be reduced. Indeed, in our model the random components of the consumption
of investors from diﬀerent countries diﬀer by the “sentiment wedge”  already described. Consump-
tions are less than perfectly correlated to the degree that  is more volatile. When it so happens
that b  = b  =0  consumptions are for a brief moment perfectly correlated across countries.
But, as the disagreements,
¡
b 
b 

¢
, ﬂuctuate around zero, the consumption correlation changes
accordingly. For instance, as shown in the table above, consumption correlation drops to 0.69 with
a disagreement of only b  = b  = −001. Consumption correlation, in some states of nature, can
be very low and even negative, for some extreme values of disagreement. Contrary to the majority
of empirical evidence, however, the correlation of consumptions in most cases remains above the
correlation of outputs, which in our model is by assumption equal to zero.
4.3 Foreign capital inﬂow and domestic return co-movement
We now turn to our next international empirical regularity: the co-movement between returns
and capital ﬂows. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) have shown that capital ﬂows into countries
at the same time the stock market of that country experiences above average returns. According
to the asymmetric-information model of Brennan and Cao (1997), the interpretation would be
that foreigners are less informed about a country’s ﬁrms than are the country’s residents. As they
30see domestic stock prices going up, less informed foreigners speculate that residents have received
good news. They then buy the domestic country’s stocks. In this section, we show that our general-
equilibrium model can deliver this same relationship for a diﬀerent but somewhat analogous reason.
Our framework mimics the domestic investor’s informational advantage as found in the asym-
metric information literature. Recall that Brennan and Cao (1997) show that less informed investors
should buy shares at the same time the prices of these shares rises. By way of empirical veriﬁcation,
they regress quarterly gross capital ﬂow from home to foreign country — deﬂated by the average
gross capital ﬂow of the last four quarters — on quarterly foreign-market return. They generally
ﬁnd positive slope coeﬃcients. A representative sample across countries is shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Source: Brennan and Cao (1997). They regress quarterly gross capital ﬂow from home to
foreign country — deﬂated by the average gross capital ﬂow of the last four quarters — on quarterly
foreign-market return. They obtain the positive slope coeﬃcients shown here.
Country Regression coeﬃcient
Canada 719
Germany 683
Japan 479
United Kingdom 153
Argentina 544
Mexico 605
Indonesia 3511
Turkey 228
In our setup, gross international capital ﬂows are interpreted as the dollar demand of home-
country (say, Country ) investors for foreign stock 
 (the “target” country is then Country
). However, barring the use of a simulation, it is not possible for us to replicate exactly the
deﬂation by the last four quarters of capital ﬂows that was done by Brennan and Cao. Presumably
they did that because they wanted a measure of ﬂows relative to some outstanding amounts and
they did not have available the outstanding amounts. We can produce the outstanding amounts

 directly from our model, however. Therefore, as the closest approximation available, we
calculate the theoretical coeﬃcient of a regression of




on

 . In addition, we report the
correlation of capital outﬂo w sa n df o r e i g ns t o c kr e t u r n sa sw e l la st h ev o l a t i l i t yo fc a p i t a lo u t ﬂows.
Table 6 gives these results.
31Table 6: Theoretical coeﬃcient of a regression of




on


No sentiment Sentiment
Correlation of capital ﬂows and stock return 006 049
Volatility of capital outﬂows 002 219
Brennan&Cao regression beta 0005 637
Sentiment increases the correlation of capital ﬂows and stock returns to about 0.5. Since for-
eigners weight domestic output in their forecast of future dividends, they over-react to dividends,
thus driving up the correlation between capital inﬂows and domestic stock returns. Similarly, sen-
timent implies an increase in volatility in these capital ﬂows. When we calculate the implication
for the regression beta, the value of that regression coeﬃcient is essentially zero at 0005 without
sentiment, but increases to 637 with sentiment.
In our model, there is no information asymmetry. But investors have a diﬀerent interpretation of
the publicly available information. Thus, public information produces a joint reaction of portfolios
and prices that mimics their behavior under information asymmetry, as illustrated, for instance,
by the model of Brennan and Cao (1997).
5 Firm-Level Equity and Empirical Regularities
We now consider the ﬁrm-level empirical regularities described in the introduction. We evaluate
the ability of the model to reproduce the “pricing puzzle” and the “abnormal cross-listing return”.
For that purpose, we evaluate these empirical regularities using our model, and for the standard
case when all investors interpret correctly the information in both countries. We then compare the
results.
5.1 Extension of the model
Until now, we have considered one ﬁrm in each country for simplicity. In this section, we consider
two ﬁrms in Country . In particular, let there be one ﬁrm listed in Country ,w h i c hw ec a l l
Firm  and let there be two ﬁrms listed in Country ,w h i c hw ec a l lF i r m and Firm .W e
index these ﬁrms by  = {}
32Under the objective measure, the outputs of Firms  and  are as they were before but we
now introduce the output of the new Firm  as:


=  + 

where 
 is an independent Brownian motion under the objective probability measure, which
governs empirical realizations of the process. The conditional expected growth rate  of output
is also stochastic:
  = − ×
¡
 − 
¢
 + 


As before, all investors must estimate, or ﬁlter out, the current value of  and its future behavior.
They do so by observing the current cash ﬂows and the three public signals (  ) The signal
correlated with 

 evolves according to the following process:
 = 

 +
q
1 − 2

where 
 is a Brownian motion, under the objective probability measure as well. All the Brownian
motions are independent from each other.
Investors in Country  (where ﬁrms  and  are listed) perform their ﬁltering under the belief
that the signals  and  have the correct correlation with  and ; but they believe incorrectly
that the signal  has zero correlation with  which means that they ignore the information about
the ﬁrms listed in the other country. The “model” they have in mind, in addition to Equations (8)
and (9), posits that:
 = 

 +
q
1 − 2

Investors in Country  (where Firm  is listed) perform their ﬁltering under the belief that the
signal  has the correct correlation with ; but they believe incorrectly that the signals  and
 have zero correlation with  and , which means that they ignore the information about the
ﬁrms listed in the other country. The “model” they have in mind, in addition to Equations (10)
and (11), posits that:
 = 

33By following exactly the same steps as in Section 2, we can show that the vector of exogenous
states variables under the reference measure of the econometrician is given by the Markovian system
comprised of Equations (4), (5), (2), (14), (17) and (18), to which we now add the following three
analogous equations for Firm C’s dividends, expected conditional growth rate, and disagreement,
respectively:


= b 
 + 

b 
 = − ×
³
b 
 − 
´
 +



 + 

b 
 = −
µ
 +

2

¶
b 
 +
 − 


 + 

and the new change e  from the measure of investor  to that of the econometrician is:
e 
e 
= −
1

¡
b 

 + b 


¢
Therefore, we get an extended vector of ten exogenous state variables which drive the economy:
 ≡
³
 b 
b 
 b 
b 
 b 
b 

´|
where  is deﬁned as:


= −
1

b 


such that e  = ×. We get a structure that is very similar to that of our benchmark model
of Section 2. But there is a now third system  where
 =
n
 b 
b 

o
Therefore this system can be written:
 =  + Ω

where

 =
©



ª
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Ω =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
 0
³


´

³
−

´

−
µ
 


¶
0
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
Thus, the state vector can be evaluated as three independent sets of processes. For instance, the
full vector of twelve state variables e  can be written as:
e  = e  + e Ω− →  

where
− →  
 =
©







ª
and
e Ω =
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
Ω 00
0 Ω 0
00 Ω
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
where Ω is still block diagonal, which is again exploited in our solution of the equilibrium in this
extended model.
In this setting we now have six diﬀerent Brownian motions, hence we need seven linearly in-
dependent securities in order to complete the market. Since we intend to replicate a regression
of a ﬁrm excess stock return on a local country excess stock return and a foreign country excess
stock return, we choose our menu of securities accordingly. In particular we consider three stocks:
(i) a ﬁrm stock  which is a claim on the output of Firm  (); (ii) a local stock  which
is a claim on the aggregate output of Country  ( + ); and (iii) a foreign stock  which is
a claim on the foreign output . As in Subsection 3.1, we complete the market with a riskless,
instantaneously maturing bank deposit and three zero-net supply futures contracts whose prices
are in part marked to the three signals, but are uncorrelated with all the stock prices.
In general, the return on the stock market of Country  would be given by
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where  is the price of a claim on the output of Firm  (). This corresponds to a capitalization
weighted index of the two stocks traded in Country . Since we intend to run a regression of 
 −
on

 −  and 
 − , we make sure not to include Firm  in the index for the stock market
of Country , as this would bias the beta against that index. In terms of the equation above, this
is equivalent to let 
+ → 0, and, consequently,

 → 
 
5.2 Pricing puzzle: factor models
In integrated markets, risk factors are common to all securities and all securities are priced with
these same factors. In our model, with no market segmentation and with all tradeable goods,
equilibrium prices, such as Equation (28), are functions of seven state variables, each of which is
driven by four Brownian motions. Therefore, it is possible to recognize seven factors in securities
returns. However, these factors are not independent of each other since their covariation structure
has rank four. With or without foreign-sentiment risk, each of these four factors can be seen as
having a home or a foreign dimension. For instance, of the four Brownians, two are home and
foreign output shocks and two are signals shocks that are correlated with home or foreign expected
growth rates. Ultimately, the only two priced factors are world output  +  +  and the
world average sentiment
∙³


´ 1
1− +
³
˜ 

´ 1
1−
¸1−
.
The CAPM Subsection 3.2 may help explain why the risk premium of ﬁnancial securities’
c o n t a i nb o t hn a t i o n a la n dw o r l dconsumption risk factors. The factors in these CAPMs are national
consumption risk and country sentiment risk.23 By construction (in a manner similar to Equations
(17, 18)), we know that sentiment and the world output are correlated. As has been indicated
in Subsection 3.2, our model provides one interpretation of the empirical ﬁndings of two priced
factors, one being national and the other a world factor, a result commonly ascribed to some form
of segmentation. Our interpretation is that the local consumption risk is priced only as a proxy for
the world average sentiment risk. The fact that it appears to be priced derives from its correlation
23Empirical studies on two-factor international CAPMs are usually conducted on some form of market-return
CAPM, as opposed to a consumption CAPM.
36with sentiment risk, the true unobserved risk factor.
To consider this interpretation, we calculate the correlation between country sentiment

 ,
and the world consumption growth,

 ,w h e r e =  +  =  + , due to market
clearing. In the fully symmetric case when  =  =1we obtain a correlation of sentiment
in Country ,

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correlation depends on the disagreements between investors in Country  and the econometrician
on the prospects about the growth rate of output in Country . Symmetrically, the correlation of
sentiment in country ,
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However, much of the empirical literature on international stock returns focuses not upon a
CAPM, but rather on the factor structure of the returns. Empiricists typically ﬁnd that interna-
tional ﬁrm returns depend upon local factors as well as foreign or world factors. Dependence of ﬁrm
returns on local and foreign factors is often loosely interpreted as evidence for market segmentation
or non-tradeable risks. Ever since Agmon (1973) and Lessard (1976), many authors have dissected
international stock returns to ﬁnd out how much of their variance was due to country factors and
how much was due to industry factors, which are worldwide factors (see, for instance, Heston and
Rouwenhorst (1994), Cavaglia et al. (2000), Cavaglia and Moroz (2002), Brooks and Del Negro
(2004), and Brooks and Del Negro (2006) ). The ballpark ﬁgure is that country factors represent
at least 30% of variance.24 Moreover, for large multinational ﬁrms, the beta on the local market is
typically higher than the foreign market. For example, using a sample of multinational ﬁrms that
list in foreign markets, Sarkissian and Schill (2009) ﬁn dab e t ao nt h el o c a lf a c t o ro f08 and a
beta for the foreign factor of 016.T h e s eﬁrms also provide a useful benchmark for the section on
cross-listed ﬁrms below.
To consider factor variances and betas for ﬁrms in the presence of foreign-sentiment, we now
evaluate our model’s ability to replicate these results. First, recall that the cross-country correlation
of returns is lower with foreign-sentiment risk than without it. Second, we replicate linear regressions
of ﬁnancial securities return in both national and world stock market risk factors. We then evaluate
the foreign-sentiment risk impact on the regression coeﬃcients. Consider regressing the ﬁrm stock
24Bekaert,et al. (2009) conclude that this number is an overstatement.
37excess return 
 −  on the country stock excess return 
 −  and the foreign stock excess
return 
 − . We obtain the estimated regression coeﬃcients
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The regression coeﬃcients depend on the elements of the variance covariance matrix of the
vector
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We compute the stock prices using the same procedure as in the case with two stocks. The
interest rate follows from applying Itô lemma to the state price density expression. The diﬀusion of
excess returns is obtained from the corresponding gradients and the diﬀusion of the state variables,
as in the case with only two stocks. We determine the variance-covariance matrix by multiplying
the diﬀusion of excess returns by its transpose. This variance-covariance matrix includes all the
necessary second moments so that we obtain the regression coeﬃcients in closed-form.
Table 7: Betas and shares of variance explained in our model by the various factors.
No sentiment Sentiment
Two factor CAPM regression coeﬃcient for the local factor 04614 03868
Two factor CAPM regression coeﬃcient for the foreign factor 04614 03786
% of variance contributed by local factor 2693% 3189%
% of variance contributed by foreign factor 2693% 2990%
% of variance contributed by covariance between them 4614% 3821%
The verdict on the ability of the model to explain the empirical share of variance due to country
factors is contained in Table 7. In the benchmark case without sentiment the beta of the local factor
is identical to that of the foreign factor, and the share of variance explained by the local factor is
around 27%. When we add foreign-sentiment the beta of the local factor gets slightly higher than
the beta of the foreign factor, and the share of variance explained by the local factor increases to
around 32%. Although we do not match the empirical betas precisely, we obtain qualitative results
that are closer to the data by adding foreign-sentiment risk.
385.3 “Abnormal” Cross-Listing Returns
Cross-listing events present a ﬁnal feature of international security-return behavior, which has often
been associated with diﬀering economic perceptions across countries. When foreign ﬁrms list in
domestic markets, the returns on equity shares of the cross-listing ﬁrm become abnormally high
relative to the market. In particular, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) generally increase and
peak near the cross-listing event.25 Karolyi (2006) surveys the literatures that ﬁnds an abnormal
return in the week of cross-listing (the “impact” eﬀect) which is between 15% and 7%.A f t e rt h e
cross listing (the risk-premium “after-eﬀect”), Hail and Leuz (2005) ﬁnd a change in the cost of
capital which is between −07% and −12%26 An often-cited explanation for this behavior is that
the event provides new information about the future behavior of the ﬁrm. Here again Ahearne, et
al. (2004) is an inspiration. They show that U.S. investors exhibit a greater willingness to invest in
ﬁrms from countries that list on U.S. exchanges. Their interpretation is that cross-listing provides
U.S investors with information that is easier for them to interpret.
We now consider cross-listing as a mental experiment conducted on the three-ﬁrms extended
model. As before, let there be one ﬁrm in Country ,w h i c hw ec a l lF i r m and let there be
two ﬁrms in Country ,w h i c hw ec a l lF i r m and Firm . We conduct a comparative-dynamics
exercise comparing the equilibrium in which Firm  is listed in Country  to the equilibrium
i nw h i c hi ti sl i s t e db o t hi nC o u n t r y a n di nC o u n t r y We postulate that, when the ﬁrm is
cross-listed, investors in Country  know how to correctly interpret the public information about
Firm . Therefore, under cross-listing, the “model” that investors in Country  have in mind, in
addition to Equations (10) and (11), posits that:
 = 

 +
q
1 − 2

25Moreover, the correlation of these foreign ﬁrms relative to the domestic market increases.
26See also Sarkissian and Schill (2009) and King and Segal (2003).
39Following the same steps as in Section 2, the Firm  diﬀusion block under cross-listing becomes:
Ω =
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
 0
³


´

00
−
µ
 


¶
0
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
where b  is now deterministic. This result is intuitive: due to the cross listing the perception of
information in the signal of Firm  is aligned across investors from diﬀerent countries. Therefore,
disagreement about the cross-listed ﬁrm stops being a relevant risk factor. The new moment
functions for Firm  with and without cross listing are very similar to those computed in Proposition
3.
Using our model and the benchmark numbers, we calculate and display in Table 8 the eﬀect
of Firm  cross listing from Country  to Country  interpreted in the manner described above.
Regarding ﬁrst the impact eﬀect, it is obvious that, without sentiment, the eﬀect is equal to zero.
With sentiment, the change in price on impact is: 1021%, when there happened to be full agreement
at the time of the event, while the after-eﬀect on the cost of capital is equal to −008%.
Table 8: The eﬀect of Firm C cross listing from Country A to Country B
No sentiment Sentiment
Cross-listing price change (%) 000% 1021%
Cross-listing risk premium change (%) 000% −008%
Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which the relative sizes of the two countries in the cross-
listing modiﬁes the eﬀect of cross-listing, for diﬀerent levels of . Due to cross listing, disagreement
about the output growth rate of ﬁrm  is reduced. We can call that the “disagreement-risk” eﬀect.
However, that cuts two ways. Without cross-listing, investors in Country  ignore completely the
signals that are correlated with . With cross listing, they take them into account correctly. Their
increased sensitivity to the signals (the “signal-risk” eﬀect) means that the return of the stock
from Firm  becomes more volatile because there is new uncertainty about the learning process of
40Figure 1: The eﬀect of the relative sizes of the two countries in the cross-listing eﬀect for diﬀerent
levels of 
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investors from Country  This is true even in the eyes of the investors from Country  themselves.
As has been pointed out by Brennan (1998), an investor sees his own future learning as a source
of risk that must be hedged. Clearly, the disagreement-risk eﬀect operates more strongly when
 → 05, as this is the case in which the impact of the heterogeneity of beliefs is highest. In the
middle range, the interaction between investors from the two countries (i.e., the degree to which
they are scared of each other) dominates and adds up to a reduction in the amount of foreign-
sentiment risk: investors from Country  realize that those from Country  will now behave as
correctly as themselves so that, in their eyes, future price movements, that arose previously from
their disagreements, will be less erratic than before. As a result, the required return decreases and
t h es t o c kp r i c ei n c r e a s e s .
41Towards the edges, when heterogeneity is minimal, the interaction of these risks diﬀers. When
 → 0investors, who learn to interpret the signals of Firm  are predominant. So the reduction
in disagreement risk generates a price increase. When  → 1investors are predominant, so the
reduction in disagreement risk is less important, and higher signal risk is the strongest eﬀect. As
a result, there may be price decreases in that edge. In section 6 below, we show that our model is
stationary and there is a tendency for the consumption share to revert to the value of 05. Therefore,
 tends to be in the middle range where the disagreement-risk eﬀect is more important than signal
risk, and we expect in general an increase in prices from cross-listing, as observed empirically.
6S u r v i v a l
So far, we have found that a number of international ﬁnancial-market empirical regularities can be
explained by our model. But, to generate sentiment risk, our model requires the active presence of
both home and foreign investors. Given the symmetric irrationality, it is not obvious how long these
investors may survive in the market. In th i sl a s ts e c t i o n ,w ev e r i f yt h a tt h ee ﬀects of sentiment
deﬁned in this paper persist in the long-run.
Existing studies on the survival of irrational traders ask whether excessively pessimistic or
optimistic agents survive in the long run in an economy in which one population of agents knows
the true probability distribution. These studies include Kogan et al. (2006), Yan (2008) and Dumas
et al. (2009). These studies conclude that, although “irrational” traders do not survive in the
long-run, they disappear very slowly, in terms of consumption shares. In our model, both types of
investors are symmetrically underconﬁdent about the foreign signals. As a result, their individual
and symmetric irrationalities oﬀset each other and we obtain a stationary equilibrium, in which
both countries’ investors continue to participate in the economy in the long run. Foreign-sentiment,
therefore, provides a rationale for the empirical regularities described above that is valid both in
the short run and in the long run.
To show this, we obtain, as in Dumas et al. (2009), the expected value and distribution under
the objective probability measure of the future consumption share of investors from Country 
() by Fourier Inversion of the characteristic function of relative sentiment

. We study the case
42Figure 2: Top panel: the probability density function of  given a current value of  =0 25
(left-hand side) and  =0 75 (right-hand side). Bottom panel: expected values of the same.
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where Country  is currently small ( =0 25) and the case when it is currently large ( =0 75).
The left upper panel in Figure 2 plots the probability density function of  given a current
value of  =0 25 We see from this ﬁgure that, as time passes, the density moves to the right
and therefore when the consumption share of investors in Country  is currently small, it tends
to increase. The left lower panel plots the expected value of this share against time measured in
years. It shows that, compared to the benchmark case without sentiment, the consumption share
of investors in Country  reverts to the steady state value of 0.5.
The symmetry imposed in the model implies that the two exponential martingales which arise
43from the foreign-sentiment of each country investor,  and ,o ﬀset each other in the sense that
even though each of them tends to zero over time independently, the ratio of the two converges to
one, which brings  to 0.5 in the long run. The plot shows that, starting from a small consumption
share of 025, it takes about 100 years to investors in Country A to reach the steady state value of
05.
The right-hand plots of Figure 2 show that the exact same logic applies when Country  is
currently large ( =0 75). In that case, as time passes, the density moves to the left, i.e., it
decreases. We conclude that our model is stationary and that all sentiment-based explanations for
the empirical regularities presented above hold both in the short and in the long run.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
By allowing international investors to diﬀer in their interpretation of domestic and foreign public
information (a feature which we label foreign-sentiment risk), we show that four of the most striking
regularities in international ﬁnance can be at least partially resolved, including: (i) home-equity
preference; (ii) the co-movement of returns and international capital ﬂows; (iii) the dependence of
ﬁrm returns on local and foreign factors; and (iv) abnormal returns around foreign ﬁrm cross-listing
in the domestic market.
Home equity preference is a natural consequence of domestic investors perceiving the foreign
public information as less valuable than the one generated at home, even when, in fact, both
domestic and foreign public information are equally valuable. The foreign-sentiment risk, or the
risk of the behavior of others that is created by this diﬀerence in perception deters investors from
investing abroad and is priced in the market.
We generate a co-movement of returns and international capital ﬂows due to the perceived
advantage of domestic investors in processing public information about their own fundamentals.
When a positive output shock hits the domestic economy, foreign investors misinterpret public
information about domestic fundamentals, inducing a higher demand for domestic stocks. These
shocks then generate a simultaneous increase in returns in the domestic stocks, and capital ﬂows
from the foreign to the domestic country.
44Our model also implies a two-factor consumption CAPM, involving consumption-risk and
foreign-sentiment risk factors that are priced. In the model, the cross-country correlation of returns
is lower with foreign-sentiment risk than without it, a fact which would commonly be ascribed to
segmentation instead of foreign-sentiment risk. The two-factor conditional structure of returns that
we calculate from the model shows that foreign-sentiment has some potential to explain the relative
importance of local factors in explaining the expected returns of multinational companies.
Finally, our model produces an increase in stock prices for ﬁrms that cross list. Here, cross-
listing is a thought experiment, or comparative-dynamic exercise, in which the investors of the
country where the new listing occurs know how to interpret the public information about the cross-
listed ﬁrm. Due to cross-listing, disagreement is reduced, hence the amount of foreign-sentiment
risk and the required return decrease, and the ﬁrm stock price increases.
Overall, we have shown that a single type of informational friction can theoretically explain a
range of international pricing anomalies.
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Therefore, we can split the required moment function into the product of two separate ones, one
for each subset of independent state variables. Since the dynamics of the state variables in each of
t h e s eg r o u p sa r ea l m o s ti d e n t i c a lt ot h o s ei nD u m a set al. (2009), and since the object is also the
same as in that paper, we obtain a very similar result:
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47Using this solution we can write:
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The product of the last two exponentials in Equation (4) corresponds to the moment function of a
bivariate normal distribution:
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From properties of normal distributions, it follows that the product of the last two exponentials in
Equation (4) also corresponds to this alternative bivariate normal distribution:
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Therefore we obtain that the moment function given in Equation (4) is equivalent to:
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where the functions , ,  and 2
 are given in the proposition.
In order to use this moment function to compute the required expectation, we integrate over
the log output ratio conditional normal distribution, which is implicit in this moment function. By
doing so, we obtain the expression in the Proposition.
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